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 Creditors can sell their claims1 against bankrupt companies.2  Selling a 
claim allows a creditor to convert into cash a claim that may not be paid for 
years and is unlikely ever to be paid in full.3  By selling its claims, a 
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 1. The Bankruptcy Code definition of a claim is a broad one and includes any “right to 
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2009).  The definition of a claim also includes any 
“right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right 
to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.”  11 U.S.C. § 
101(5)(B) (2009).  This article focuses on the transfer of claims asserted against Chapter 11 
debtors.  Claims can also be transferred in cases brought under other Chapters of the 
Bankruptcy Code, such as Chapters 7 and 13.  See cases cited infra note 40. 
 2. See Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition—From Boom to Bust and Into the 
Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 389-90 (2007) (“The trading of distressed debt claims . . . 
started slowly and after the 1991 amendment of the Bankruptcy Rules that enhanced the free 
trading of claims and the subsequent obligation imposed upon financial institutions to 
liquefy bad loans, claims trading grew exponentially to the point that in many reorganization 
cases, a substantial portion of the creditor body changed from month to month.”). 
 3. See Thomas Donegan, Covering the “Security Blanket”:  Regulating Bankruptcy 
Claims and Claim-Participations Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 381, 384 (1998) (“Indeed, the unsecured creditor will collect its pro rata distribution, 
if any, only at the end of the proceeding and the court's confirmation of the plan.  This 
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creditor can obtain some immediate value out of overdue debts and write at 
least a portion of its losses off its books.4 
Claim purchasers buy with the hope of ultimately receiving more than 
they spend.  Consequently, a prospective purchaser will offer to pay a 
discounted price for a claim that reflects its assessment of the time value of 
money and of expected returns on the claim at the end of the bankruptcy 
process.5  Some purchasers are simply arbitraging, which is to say that they 
are investing with an eye towards receiving a distribution on claims in cash 
or readily liquidated property in excess of the purchase price.6  Other 
purchasers have more sophisticated motives.  Some purchasers seek to 
acquire the claims that they anticipate will be satisfied in the form of equity 
in the reorganized debtor, referred to as “fulcrum securities.”7 
 
confirmation may come two or three years after the proceedings have commenced.  Because 
of the automatic stay against collection efforts during the case's pendency, being able to sell 
claims provides unsecured creditors ‘with an opportunity to convert their claims into cash 
which may be needed to pay expenses.’”) (citations omitted); Glenn E. Siegel, Introduction: 
ABI Guide to Trading Claims in Bankruptcy Part 2 ABI Committee on Public Companies 
and Trading Claims, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177, 177 (2003) (“Perhaps nothing has 
changed the face of bankruptcy in the last decade as much as the newfound liquidity in 
claims.  Under the old form of bankruptcy, creditors could not expect a distribution, if any, 
on account of their claims until the end of the case . . . .  Now, in almost every size case, 
there is an opportunity for creditors to exit the bankruptcy in exchange for a payment from a 
distressed debt trader . . . .”); see also In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that 2,330 of Kmart’s suppliers were paid in full pursuant to the critical vendor order 
reversed on appeal, while 45,000 Kmart creditors eventually received about 10¢ on the 
dollar, mostly in the form of stock in the reorganized Kmart); see generally Lynn M. 
LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2007) 
(comparing delay in payout to creditors in cases with and without asset sales authorized 
prior to confirmation of plan of reorganization). 
 4. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking 
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1990) (“[A] prepetition 
creditor or shareholder may not be able to establish a tax loss for its claim or stock until the 
claim or stock can be sold or a plan is confirmed.  The availability of a market for claims 
and stock allows a creditor or shareholder to sell its claim or stock in order to utilize the tax 
loss at a time most favorable to it while maximizing the sale proceeds in a free trading 
market.”). 
 5. See id. at 5 (“First, the postpetition investor bets that the plan of reorganization will 
yield creditors or stockholders more than the price the investor paid for its claims or stock.  
Second, the postpetition investor bets that such a plan of reorganization will be confirmed 
and consummated before the investor's cost of carrying the investment—the time value of 
money—consumes whatever profit the investor hopes to make on the discount.”). 
 6. See James H.M. Sprayregen, Roger J. Higgins & Jonathan Friedland, Chapter 11: 
Not Perfect, but Better than the Alternative, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 61-62, n.29 (2005) 
(“This generalization is not meant to disregard those market participants who arbitrage trade 
and similar unsecured claims by purchasing them with the prospect of receiving a recovery 
(usually in cash or easily liquidated property) greater than the purchase price.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Simeon Gold & Daniel Holzman, Shopping for Distressed Companies, 
METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 2008, at 42 (“If a purchaser desires to strengthen its position 
in the acquisition of an entire company under a plan of reorganization, there are steps it can 
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Other investors seek to acquire claims with an eye towards buying a 
bankrupt company’s assets.8  Credit bidding9 allows a holder of a claim that 
is secured by a lien to “use its claim as currency” if the assets of the 
bankrupt company are sold pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.10  An investor can buy a secured claim at a discount and then bid the 
full face value of the claim11 to try to acquire assets that are for sale.12 
By buying a stake in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings, claim 
purchasers obtain the right to be heard at proceedings arising during 
various stages in the life of the bankruptcy13 and to weigh in on proposed 
 
take.  The purchaser can acquire a stake in the ‘fulcrum’ securities of the bankrupt seller 
(i.e., those obligations of the seller that, based on the likely valuation of the seller's business 
by the bankruptcy court, are likely to receive equity in the reorganized business).”); see also 
Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing:  An Empirical Study of Investors’ 
Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 82 (2008) (citing study results illustrating firm 
propensities to pursue exchanges of debt for equity). 
 8. A Chapter 11 debtor may sell all or substantially all of its assets prior to the 
proposal of a plan of reorganization pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363(b).  See In re 
Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring a good business reason for such 
sales); see also 2 BANKRUPTCY DESK GUIDE § 15:40 (Thomson West 2009) (collecting and 
comparing standards across federal circuits for bankruptcy court approval of sales of all or 
substantially all of debtor assets). 
 9. Bankruptcy Code section 363(k) creates a right to credit bid, by providing: 
At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is subject to a lien that secures 
an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may 
bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder may 
offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.  11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2009); 
see also 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW 
& PRACTICE § 44:32 (3d ed. 2009) (“An entity with an interest in property being sold free 
and clear of such interest may bid for the property unless the court, for cause, orders 
otherwise.  If that entity is the high bidder, under Code § 363(k), it may offset the value of 
its interest against the property’s purchase price.”). 
 10. Corinne Ball, Distressed Mergers and Acquisitions: Credit Bidding as an Effective 
Tool, 232 N.Y. L.J., Corporate Update, Sept. 30, 2004. 
 11. See, e.g., In re SubMicron Systems Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 459-60 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It 
is well settled among district and bankruptcy courts that creditors can bid the full face value 
of their secured claims under § 363(k).”). 
 12. See Ball, supra note 10 (discussing the importance of credit bidding as a 
consideration in the context of a going concern sale under Section 363). 
 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2009) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the 
trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity 
security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any 
issue in a case under this chapter.”).  For example, claim traders looking to expedite returns 
on their investments may use the right to be heard conferred by Bankruptcy Code section 
1109(b) to support a piecemeal sale of the debtor.  See Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did 
Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13-14 (2009) (testimony 
of Harvey R. Miller, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal, & Manges, LLP), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Miller090311.pdf (“Distressed debt traders and 
hedge funds have different objectives than those of vendor/suppliers.  They are motivated by 
quick and sizeable returns on their investment.  Because their entry price usually is much 
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plans of reorganization14 in order to advance their interests.15 
The practice of claims trading is “as old as the Republic.”16  The 
authors of one of the seminal articles about modern claims trading have 
traced the American practice to the year 1790: 
The first recorded instance of American fiduciaries trading 
claims against insolvent debtors predates all federal bankruptcy 
laws and goes back to 1790.  The insolvent “debtors” were 
several of the initial thirteen states, and the “claims” were the 
debt securities issued by the states-mostly Northern states-during 
the Revolutionary War to pay both the colonies' soldiers and the 
farmers and merchants who had supplied them.  The “fiduciaries” 
were “the founding fathers”-members of the First Congress of the 
United States.  Those Congressmen and their friends purchased 
the states' debt securities at ten and twenty-five cents on the 
dollar at the same time as they were considering legislation to 
have the new federal government assume liability and pay the 
securities 100 cents on the dollar from the proceeds of the sale of 
public lands. 
 
James Madison objected to this breach of public trust.  He 
introduced legislation which would have paid soldiers and other 
original holders of the securities 100 cents on the dollar while 
paying speculators and other subsequent holders of the securities 
only the highest prevailing market price.  The balance of 
payments on the speculators' securities was to go to their original 
holders.  But Madison's bill was rejected by the House of 
Representatives: of the sixty-four members of the House, twenty-
nine had purchased securities at a discount.17 
 The rights associated with transferred claims continue to matter over 
 
lower than the face amount of the acquired debt, they are more apt to favor the sale and 
dismemberment of a debtor, if it will yield faster and greater recoveries based upon the costs 
of purchasing claims.  Unless they are extending loans to own the debtor, a process that 
gained some favor in the mid-2000s, there is little or no interest in the rehabilitation of the 
debtor.”). 
 14. For example, claims purchasers can vote down a debtor’s proposed plan of 
reorganization to maximize distributions paid out on their claims.  See Kevin J. Coco, Empty 
Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and Ownership Disclosure in Chapter 11 
Cases, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 610, 615 (2008) (“It is these active investors who, 
because they have the ability to shut down a debtor’s ability to reorganize, present the 
greatest threat to the active rehabilitation and reorganization of debtors, which are the two 
primary goals of Chapter 11.”). 
 15. For ease of reference, the opening paragraphs of this article refer to sellers and 
purchasers, rather than assignors and assignees.  One district court has drawn a distinction 
between the consequences of effectuating a claim trade through a sale rather than via an 
assignment.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 16. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 4, at 26. 
 17. Id. at 25-26. 
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two hundred years later because of how tempting transferring claims is to 
creditors hungry for cash and how easily claims can be transferred18 to 
eager investors.19  In the Information Age, bankruptcy claims are traded 
through websites like www.secondmarket.com.20  Reporting the record-
setting21 fourth quarter of 2008, SecondMarket anticipates the “continuing 
 
 18. Although a creditor can readily find an investor to which to transfer its bankruptcy 
claims, transfer documentation usually does not allow the creditor to wash its hands of the 
claims or to stop participating in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings.  The documentation 
may, for example, require the claim transferor to take back the claims or to repay the 
transferee for the impaired portion of the claims if the debtor challenges the claims.  See, 
e.g., Lisa Gretchko, How to Analyze a Claim-Transfer Agreement, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Mar. 24, 2005, at 24, 64 (analyzing how a claims trader buys claims from an unsecured 
creditor).  Additionally, as discussed infra Part II, at least one bankruptcy court has held that 
to the extent that the debtor assumes the contract(s) underlying the claims, the debtor’s 
counterparty—not the transferee—will negotiate cure amounts with, and receive cure 
payments from, the debtor.  Also, pursuant to Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor 
can sue a creditor to seek the return of transfers made to the creditor prior to or following 
the bankruptcy filing.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 548(a), 549(a) (authorizing the 
avoidance of certain transfers).  Such suits frequently include a cause of action seeking 
disallowance of any claims asserted by the creditor pending return of the challenged 
transfers.  See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (“Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, 
the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable under 
section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under 
section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or 
transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such entity or 
transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title.”); infra Part I.A. 
 19. See, e.g., Argo Partners, http://www.argopartners.net (last visited May 17, 2009) 
(“Argo Partners is an investment firm that specializes in purchasing potential future cash 
flows of distressed, often bankrupt, entities”); Cash for Claims, http://riversideclaims.com 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (advertising that people with a valid claim against a corporation 
can “[g]et[] cash quickly”); Creditor Liquidity Asset Management, LLC, 
http://www.creditorliquidity.com (last visited May 17, 2009) (“Creditor Liquidity . . . 
provides creditors an opportunity to receive a cash payment for its bankruptcy claim in 
advance of the conclusion of the Chapter 11 case.”); Liquidity Solutions Inc., 
http://www.liquiditysolutions.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (“Liquidity Solutions . . . 
provides cash for paper assets that ordinarily are illiquid.”); Madison Liquidity Investors, 
http://www.madisonliquidity.com/bankruptcy.html (last visited May 17, 2009) (“Madison 
Liquidity Investors provides a cash option that allows you to partially collect on your 
receivables, . . .”). 
 20. See SecondMarket, http://www.secondmarket.com/about/ (last visited May 17, 
2009) (“SecondMarket is the largest centralized marketplace and auction platform for 
illiquid assets, such as . . . bankruptcy claims . . .”).  While all claim holders are invited to 
sell their claims through SecondMarket, only “accredited investors” can buy claims through 
the site.  See SecondMarket, http://www.secondmarket.com/forms/buyers.php (last visited 
May 17, 2009) (requiring prospective buyers to provide “Certification of Accreditation”).  
Bankruptcy claims can also be traded by using the services of Administar Services Group 
LLC.  See Bankruptcy Administration Solutions, http://www.administarllc.com/bankruptcy-
claims-trading-distressed-investing.asp (last visited May 17, 2009) (“Administar helps . . . 
investors buy and sell claims in bankruptcy cases.”). 
 21. See SecondMarket Business Update Q4 2008 at 1, 
http://www.secondmarket.com/pdf/224.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (“We had another 
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strong interest on the buy-side”.22 
SecondMarket’s new claims trading platform23 has been discussed in 
connection with the trading of claims asserted in multi-billion dollar cases.  
Reuters reported on September 25, 2008 that SecondMarket would begin 
“trading bankruptcy claims created by the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
Chapter 11 filing” and observed that “[w]ith $639 billion in assets and 
more than 100,000 creditors, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy is the largest 
in the U.S. to date.”24  On February 26, 2009, tax experts suggested that 
investors in the $65 Billion Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Bernard Madoff25 
should consider selling their claims in the SIPA liquidation proceedings of 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC26 through SecondMarket to 
establish a theft loss deduction on their taxes.27 
Soon after SecondMarket launched its site, a similar European 
marketplace, IlliquidX, was launched at the European Distressed Credit 
Investing Conference by a company based in the United Kingdom.28  
 
record quarter and another record year.  We nearly quadrupled our revenue while, at the 
same time, maintaining profitability”). 
 22. Id. at 3. 
 23. SecondMarket launched its website in 2008.  Id. at 1. 
 24. SecondMarket to Trade Lehman Bros. Bankruptcy Claims: Adds Bankruptcy 
Industry Veterans to Bankruptcy Claims Trading Business, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS138828+25-Sep-2008+BW20080925; see 
also Chelsea Emery, Lehman Creditors Can Now Trade Their Claims, SECONDMARKET 
PRESS ROOM, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.secondmarket.com/press-article/lehman-creditors-
can-now-trade-their-claims.html (“SecondMarket, which provides a marketplace for illiquid 
assets, said on Thursday it will begin trading bankruptcy claims created by the Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 filing.”); Linda Sandler, Lehman Fuels $3 Billion Market 
in IOUs for Toner, Consulting, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&refer=us&sid=akk7HGbIfmRE 
(“The Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy may be the fuel that lifts Barry Silbert's 
four-year-old business[, SecondMarket,] to the next level.”). 
 25. See Diane B. Henriques, Madoff Will Plead Guilty; Faces Life for Vast Swindle, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A1 (“Bernie L. Madoff is facing life in prison for operating a 
vast Ponzi scheme that . . . consumed billions of dollars of other people's money.”). 
 26. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities 
LLC, SIPA Liquidation, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed December 11, 
2008). 
 27. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.105 (2009) (discussing theft losses deductions available to 
investors in enterprises discovered to be criminally fraudulent Ponzi schemes); Melissa 
Hoffmann Lajara, NYSSCPA Panel Talks Madoff Tax Treatment, NYSSCPA.ORG E-ZINE, 
Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.nysscpa.org/ezine/ETPArticles/ML22609a.htm (stating that 
“‘one of the most basic pieces’ of recovery . . . is the theft loss deduction” and mentioning 
SecondMarket as a place where theft loss can be exactly determined). 
 28. See Simona Franciosi, IlliquidX, The Illiquid Asset Trading Platform has been 
Launched in Europe, http://www.illiquidx.com/news/news1.php (last visited May 17, 2009) 
(“IlliquidX, the illiquid asset trading platform, has been launched at European Distressed 
Credit Investing conference on the 13th of March 2009, in London”); see generally The 
Platform and How it Works, http://www.illiquidx.com/platform.php (last visited May 17, 
2009) (describing IlliquidX’s platform). 
WIENERFINAL_TWO 1/18/2010  6:01:42 PM 
2009] TRANSFERRED BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS 41 
 
IlliquidX’s claims trading platform includes “[s]cheduled and unscheduled 
claims . . . [p]erforming or nonperforming healthcare receivables . . . VAT 
receivables and other trade claims.”29  The launches of the SecondMarket 
and IlliquidX claims trading platforms reflect a continuing appetite for both 
interstate and international claims trading.30 
The Bankruptcy Code does not regulate the transfer of claims.31  
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)32 requires disclosure of 
certain kinds of claim transfers33 but does not impose any substantive 
 
 29. IlliquidX, http://www.illiquidx.com/pagina.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). 
 30. Claims trading outside of American bankruptcy courts is beyond the scope of this 
article.  The authors welcome comparative perspectives from those familiar with the 
practice of claims trading in the European Union and elsewhere. 
 31. See Thomas Donegan, Covering the “Security Blanket”: Regulating Bankruptcy 
Claims and Claim-Participations Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 BANKR. 
DEV. J. 381, 389 (1998); Herbert P. Minkel, Jr. & Cynthia A. Baker, Claims and Control in 
Chapter 11 Cases:  A Call for Neutrality, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 35, 101 (1991) (”The 
Bankruptcy Code is silent on the question of claims trading.”); see generally 11 U.S.C. § 
101 et seq. (2009) (the Bankruptcy Code). 
 32. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e) provides: 
(1) Transfer of claim other than for security before proof filed 
If a claim has been transferred other than for security before proof of the claim 
has been filed, the proof of claim may be filed only by the transferee or an 
indenture trustee. 
(2) Transfer of claim other than for security after proof filed 
If a claim other than one based on a publicly traded note, bond, or debenture has 
been transferred other than for security after the proof of claim has been filed, 
evidence of the transfer shall be filed by the transferee. The clerk shall 
immediately notify the alleged transferor by mail of the filing of the evidence of 
transfer and that objection thereto, if any, must be filed within 20 days of the 
mailing of the notice or within any additional time allowed by the court. If the 
alleged transferor files a timely objection and the court finds, after notice and a 
hearing, that the claim has been transferred other than for security, it shall enter 
an order substituting the transferee for the transferor. If a timely objection is not 
filed by the alleged transferor, the transferee shall be substituted for the 
transferor. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e)(1)-(2); see id. at 3001(e)(3)-(5) (concerning transfers of claims 
for security and procedural requirements for objections). 
 33. The Rule does not apply, for example, to transfers of debt instruments created 
through participations and syndications.  See Kevin J. Coco, Empty Manipulation: 
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and Ownership Disclosure in Chapter 11 Cases, 2008 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 610, 618 n.37 (2008) (“[I]t is rare to see a Rule 3001(e) filing for 
either bank loans or bond debt [, which are both typically participated.]”); Robert D. Drain 
& Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 
10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569, 578 n.42 (2002) (“Rule 3001(e) never applied to 
participations . . .”).  Also, the Rule does not expressly impose a notice requirement when 
claim holders transfer the economic interests in their bankruptcy claims, not the claims 
themselves, via derivative instruments like credit default swaps.  See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu 
& Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and 
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 730-35 (2008) (discussing “empty crediting” by holders 
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restrictions on claims trading.34  As a result, bankruptcy courts have had to 
rule on issues arising out of claims trading with limited statutory guidance.  
Bankruptcy courts presiding over cases in which claims were traded have 
confronted a host of issues including: imposing disclosure obligations;35 
preventing conflicts of interest on creditors’ committees36 and bad faith 
voting on reorganization plans;37 and preserving the beneficial tax 
consequences of net operating losses.38 
Although the practice of claims trading can introduce complications 
into Chapter 11 proceedings that would not arise otherwise, it is not 
unlawful.39  Indeed, appellate courts have validated challenged bankruptcy 
 
of credit default swaps); Corporate Bankruptcy:  Burning Down the House, THE 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2009, at 5, available at 2009 WLNR 5332126 (discussing Lyondell’s 
Chapter 11 filing). 
 34. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee’s note to 1991 Amendments 
(“[Subsection (e) was] amended to limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes 
regarding transfers of claims. . . . This rule is not intended either to encourage or discourage 
postpetition transfers of claims or to affect any remedies otherwise available under 
nonbankruptcy law to a transferor or transferee such as for misrepresentation in connection 
with the transfer of a claim.”). 
 35. See, e.g., In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(concerning disclosure obligations of ad hoc equity committees under Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 2019). 
 36. See Robert P. Enayati, Undermining the Trading Wall:  The BAPCPA’s Affront on 
the Creditors’ Committees’ Duty of Confidentiality in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 703 (2008) (explaining that trading walls within a given entity can prevent a 
conflict of interests); Michael P. Richman & Jonathan E. Aberman, Creditors’ Committees 
Under the Microscope:  Recent Developments Highlight Hazards of Self-Dealing, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., SEPT. 26, 2007, AT 22 (discussing how a few recent cases concerning 
conflicts of interest highlight the need for the highest fiduciary duty). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Allegheny, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 290 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) 
(designating votes cast in bad faith); Frederick Tung, Confirmation & Claims Trading, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 1745-54 (1996) (discussing Allegheny and the good-faith 
requirement). 
 38. See Jean Morris, Imposition of Transfer Limitations on Claims and Equity Interests 
During Corporate Debtor’s Chapter 11 Case to Preserve the Debtor’s Net Operating Loss 
Carryforward:  Examining the Emerging Trend, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 285 (2003); Carrianne 
Basler & Michelle Campbell, Savvy Claims Purchasers Must Avoid Pitfalls, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., June 25, 2006, at 26 (“[Courts have helped debtors safeguard] . . . net operating 
losses . . . to offset against future tax liabilities . . . .”). 
 39. Some investments in pending proceedings are prohibited by the doctrine of 
champerty.  Champerty is “[a] bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which 
the stranger pursues the party’s claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment 
proceeds; it is one type of ‘maintenance,’ the more general term which refers to maintaining, 
supporting, or promoting another’s litigation.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 
1990).  The restrictions of champerty come to mind because institutional investors buy 
bankruptcy claims with the understanding that litigation over the amount, classification, and 
correct debtor designation for the transferred claims may arise through the omnibus claim 
objection process.  Indeed, sophisticated claims traders incorporate indemnities into claim 
transfer documentation to protect against objectionable claims.  See Gretchko, supra note 18 
(analyzing the process of claims transfers for unsecured creditors and the incentives of the 
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claim trades, even in the absence of the filing of the notice of transfer 
required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e).40 
But what is the nature of the transferred bankruptcy claim?  Does the 
transfer of a bankruptcy claim somehow transform it? Can the transferee of 
a bankruptcy claim obtain a claim with rights superior to the transferor’s? 
Does the manner in which a claim is transferred change the answer to these 
questions?  What rights can be transferred as part of a claim trade?  Are all 
of the rights to payment arising out of the receivables underlying a 
bankruptcy claim transferred when a claim is transferred?  Can contingent 
reimbursement rights be transferred? 
The answers to these, and related questions, impact the claims 
administration process in the many Chapter 11 cases in which claims are 
traded and affect distributions to creditors and other constituencies of 
bankruptcy estates who are not parties to the trades.  The answers to these 
 
claim purchasers).  The filing of waves of objections is endemic to the claim administration 
process in large Chapter 11 cases.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007(c)–(f) (setting forth 
requirements for omnibus objections); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007 advisory committee’s note to 
2007 amendments (“The rule also is amended to authorize the filing of a pleading that joins 
objections to more than one claim. Such filings present a significant opportunity for the 
efficient administration of large cases, but the rule includes restrictions on the use of these 
omnibus objections to ensure the protection of the due process rights of the claimants.”); see 
also Michelle Campbell, Carrianne Basler & Kerri Lyman, The Travelers Effect, 26 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 28, 29 (2007) (“In a typical case, the claims-reconciliation process works 
like this: (1) the schedules of assets and liabilities are filed; (2) a bar date is set; (3) creditors 
file claims; (4) perhaps the court adopts specialized claim-objection procedures specially 
tailored to fit the needs of the case; (5) the debtors and their advisors begin reconciling the 
claims to accounts payable; (6) the debtor files some omnibus claim objections, settles some 
claims and litigates others; and (7) creditor recovery scenarios are developed for plan 
purposes.”).  Negotiations over reduction and reclassification of claims often take place 
while claims are noticed for litigation under the debtor’s claim objection procedures order.  
See, e.g., Joint Stipulation And Agreed Order Compromising And Allowing Proofs Of 
Claim Numbers 6672 And 10380 (Contrarian Funds, LLC And MeadWestvaco 
Corporation), In re Delphi Corp., Chapter 11 Case No. 05-44481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 
2008) (referencing settlement agreement entered into by the parties while the Twenty-First 
Omnibus Claims Objection was pending).  Still, claims trading is apparently not barred by 
champerty.  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) (providing notice requirements for claim 
transfers); see also Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion and Republic of Peru, 194 
F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the investor was not precluded from seeking damages 
for non-payment of distressed foreign sovereign debt by the doctrine of champerty even 
when the debt was bought with the intention of bringing suit to collect it). 
 40. See, e.g., In re Kreisler, 546 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing equitable 
subordination of $900,000 claim purchased for $16,500 by entity formed by Chapter 7 
debtors in order to purchase claims against their own bankruptcy estates, although no notice 
of transfer had been filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)); 
accord In re Burnett, 306 B.R. 313 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (holding that transferee of claims 
asserted against Chapter 13 debtors need not disclose amounts paid to transferor to acquire 
claims and reversing disallowance of transferred claims), aff’d, 435 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
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questions also affect the flow of billions of dollars41 among distressed debt 
traders and the documentation of trades. 
This article sets out some recent rulings concerning the nature of 
transferred bankruptcy claims.  Some rulings issued in the bankruptcy 
proceedings that followed the notorious collapse of Enron, which are 
discussed in Part I below, have made their way into articles,42 while the 
remainder of the rulings seem to have flown under the radar.  We write in 
order to highlight uncertainties inherent in bankruptcy claims trading, many 
of which can be addressed in the documentation of trades.  We also share 
the rulings we have encountered in our practices so that judges ruling on 
claims trading issues have the benefit of each other’s insights and so that 
lawmakers can consider whether there is a need for statutory guidance. 
I. Does the Nature of a Transferred Bankruptcy Claim Remain the Same 
No Matter Whose Hands it is in or Can the Transferee Hold a Claim 
with Rights Superior to the Transferor’s? 
This remains an open question.  There are conflicting rulings by 
Bankruptcy and District Courts in the Second Circuit arising out of the 
bankruptcy proceedings of Enron and Ames Department Stores.  Before 
describing the rulings, we offer thumbnail sketches of claim disallowance 
and equitable subordination of claims and an overview of the debate 
concerning how these concepts affect transferred claims. 
 
 41. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance & Public Policy Implications 
of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 713 n.36 (2008) (explaining 
that there is an increase in activist distressed debt investors in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom that is changing the dynamic of and creating new challenges for corporate 
restructuring). 
 42. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Misken, Attention Claim Traders: A Claim in the Hands of a 
Transferee is Subject to § 502(d) Disallowance, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 25, 2006, at 1 
(explaining how the Enron bankruptcy court erroneously failed to conduct a thorough “plain 
meaning” analysis of §502(d), resulting in judicial focus on the claim rather than the holder 
of an avoidable transfer); Lawrence Kotler, Claim Purchasers Beware: No Good-Faith 
Defense to Equitable Subordination, 22 BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 25, 2006, at 1 (warning 
practitioners to include standard representation and warranty provisions in the forms to 
purchase and sell distressed debt as a result of the “Enron Opinion”); Jennifer Witherell 
Crastz, Can a Claims Purchaser Receive Better Rights (or Worse Rights) than its Transferor 
in a Bankruptcy?, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 365, 371-73 (2007) (discussing the creation of a new 
conundrum created by the district court in the Enron bankruptcy by turning its decision on 
an analysis of the previously interchangeable sale versus assignment terminology); Andrew 
H. Sherman, Can the Enron Claims Trading Issues Be Avoided?: Should You Consider 
Acquiring a Distribution Right?, BANKR. STRATEGIST (L.J. Newsletters), March 2007 
(providing an investment strategy for claim purchasers to help them avoid subjection to later 
attack and subordination of a claim, a precedent set by the holding of In re Enron Corp). 
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A. Thumbnail Sketch of Claim Disallowance Based on Receipt of 
Voidable Transfers 
Under Bankruptcy Code section 502(d), a bankruptcy claim is subject 
to disallowance if the claimant receives property that is recoverable by the 
bankruptcy estate.  Once the claimant pays what it owes, the claim is no 
longer subject to disallowance on this basis.43  Section 502(d) “precludes 
entities which have received voidable transfers from sharing in the 
distribution of the assets of the [bankruptcy] estate unless and until the 
voidable transfer[s] ha[ve] been returned to the estate.”44  The most 
common voidable transfers are preferences and fraudulent transfers.45 
Basically,46 through a preference action, a debtor in possession47 may 
seek to claw back transfers (including transfers of money) that it made 
while insolvent, on or within the 90 days before the filing of its bankruptcy 
 
 43. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2009) (“Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section, the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable 
under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable 
under section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such 
entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such 
entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title.”) 
 44. In re Mid Atl. Fund, Inc., 60 B.R. 604, 609 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 45. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 548(a) (2009) (respectively, the preference and fraudulent 
transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 46. A more extensive discussion of preferences and fraudulent transfers is beyond the 
scope of this article.  Much has been written about the elements of and defenses to 
preference and fraudulent transfer actions.  For more detailed discussions, see David B. 
Young, Preferences & Fraudulent Transfers, 895 PLI/Comm 713 (2007); Hon. William H. 
Brown, Dennis J. Connolly, David A. Lander, and Timothy M. Lupinacci, 2007 Norton 
Bankruptcy Law Seminar Materials: Advanced Issues in Avoidance, available at 
http://www.nortoninstitutes.org/07SeminarMaterials/07Avoidance/M07-
AvoidanceIssuesTOC.html (last visited April 9, 2009). 
 47. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes trustees to claw back preferential and fraudulent 
transfers.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 548(a) (2006).  In Chapter 11 cases in which a 
trustee is not appointed, the bankrupt company is a “debtor in possession” and has the rights 
and powers of a trustee, including the ability to bring actions seeking the avoidance and 
recovery of voidable transfers.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2009) (setting forth rights and 
powers of debtors in possession); In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 22 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 
1994) (holding that two-year limitations period for trustee to bring avoidance proceeding 
also applies to debtor in possession).  This article refers to avoidance actions by debtors and 
debtors in possession because its focus is on claim trades in Chapter 11 cases and trustees 
are rarely appointed in Chapter 11 cases.  See Harner, supra note 41, at 730.  See generally 
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2009) (setting forth the limited circumstances under which a court 
should appoint a Chapter 11 trustee).  We note, for the sake of completion, that some courts 
have held that creditors committees can be granted derivative standing to bring avoidance 
actions when the trustee or debtor in possession refuse to initiate suit.  See, e.g., Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics v. Chinery, 330 
F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing power of bankruptcy courts to authorize creditor 
committees to sue derivatively to recover property for the benefit of the estate). 
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petition (or in the case of transfers to an insider, within a year of the 
bankruptcy filing) provided that the transfers were made to or for the 
benefit of a creditor and for or on account of an antecedent debt.  The 
challenged transfers must also have allowed the creditor to receive more 
than it would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation.48 
Preference law reaches back over a defined period prior to 
bankruptcy and restructures transactions so as to level out the 
overall treatment received by similar creditors.  This does not 
imply that the transfers [made prior to the bankruptcy filing that 
are] avoided to accomplish this leveling were immoral or 
improper when made.  Rather, they are avoided because their 
effect contravenes bankruptcy law concepts as to the economic 
effects sought in a distribution of assets or income.49 
Furthermore, through a fraudulent transfer action, which is more 
complicated, a debtor can undo transfers and obligations made with an 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or for which less than 
reasonably equivalent value was received at a time when the debtor was or 
would soon be insolvent.50  The reachback periods vary depending on the 
nature of the fraudulent transfer51 and whether state or federal law is 
invoked.52  If a challenged transfer is voided (on the basis that it constitutes 
either a preference or fraudulent transfer), it can be recovered from not only 
the initial transferee, but also those who received a transfer of the property 
from the transferee.53 
 
 48. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2009); see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2009) (setting forth 
defenses), 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (2009) (creating a presumption of insolvency). 
 49. 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTH, III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & 
PRACTICE § 66:1 (3d ed. 2009). 
 50. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2009). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2009) (allowing trustees and debtors in possession to 
invoke state law by providing that “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may 
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the 
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is 
allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable under section 502(e) of this 
title.”). Under New York law, for example, the statute of limitations for fraudulent 
conveyance claims is six years.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2009) (“[A]n action 
based upon fraud; the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater 
of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff 
or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable 
diligence have discovered it.”); In re Borriello, 329 B.R. 367, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(citing Island Holding, LLC v. O’Brien, 775 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep’t 2004)) (“An action 
under New York law to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is governed by the six-year statute 
of limitation [sic] for actions grounded in fraud, commencing at the time of the 
conveyance.”).  New York State law is cited by way of example of a state law on fraudulent 
conveyances. The application of choice of law principles to avoidance actions, including 
fraudulent conveyance actions, is beyond the scope of the article. 
 53. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2009) (authorizing suits against “immediate” and “mediate” 
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B. Thumbnail Sketch of Equitable Subordination of Claims 
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 510(c)(1), a court may “under 
principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of 
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed 
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed 
interest.”54  The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York 
recently described equitable subordination as a remedy “available when (1) 
the claimholder engaged in inequitable conduct, (2) the misconduct caused 
injury to the creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimholder, 
and (3) equitable subordination is consistent with bankruptcy law.”55 
Neither the disallowance nor the equitable subordination provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code expressly reference holders of transferred bankruptcy 
claims.  Debtors have invoked these provisions to challenge transferred 
claims on the basis that claims subject to disallowance and equitable 
subordination should not be washed by the mere act of transfer.  Debtors 
thereby try to prevent claim traders, who can protect themselves through 
warranties and indemnities, from profiting at the expense of creditors of 
bankruptcy estates who are unable to protect themselves.  Claim transferees 
counter that, as third parties acting in good faith, their claims are beyond 
the reach of the disallowance and equitable subordination provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Among other things, they argue that their claims should 
not be tainted by the conduct of the claim transferors and that allowing 
their claims to be tainted will have a chilling effect on distressed debt 
trading.56 
C. Attempts to Disallow and Subordinate Claims Asserted By 
Transferees Against the Enron Debtors 
After the infamous collapse of Enron and the ensuing bankruptcy 
filings, the Enron debtors filed a complaint alleging multiple causes of 
action against Enron’s former lender banks, including various Citigroup 
 
transferees); see also 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (2009) (limiting recovery in instances in which 
multiple parties are sued to a single satisfaction). 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2009).  Under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(2) (2009), a court may 
“order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate.” 
 55. In re Copperfield Investments, LLC, 401 B.R. 87, 95 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Nassau Assocs.), 169 B.R. 
832, 837 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)). 
 56. For a summary of the competing positions, see In re Enron Corp., 333 B.R. 205, 
215-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (setting forth competing positions with respect to equitable 
subordination of transferred claims); In re Enron Corp., 340 B.R. 180, 188-90 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2006)  (setting forth competing positions with respect to disallowance of 
transferred claims). 
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entities and others (the “MegaComplaint”).57  In the MegaComplaint, 
Enron sought a recovery from “the banks and investment banks that bear 
substantial responsibility for the stunning downfall of what was once the 
seventh largest corporation in the United States” based on a “multi-year 
scheme to manipulate Enron’s financial statements and misstate its 
financial condition.”58  The MegaComplaint sought, among other things, to 
avoid and recover multiple allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers 
arising from challenged transactions entered into with Citigroup entities.59  
In addition, the MegaComplaint called for the disallowance and equitable 
subordination of all claims asserted by the defendants, including the named 
Citigroup entities.60  Enron also sought to disallow and equitably 
subordinate claims that had been transferred by the various defendants.61 
Enron subsequently filed a wave of complaints against the claim 
transferees (the “Transferee Litigation”).62  The complaints sought 
disallowance and equitable subordination of the claims asserted by the 
transferees on the basis that the claims would have been subject to 
disallowance and equitable subordination if the Enron lender banks holding 
the claims as of the date of Enron’s bankruptcy filings had not transferred 
them.63 
The District Court granted leave to file interlocutory appeal after the 
complaints were met with unsuccessful motions to dismiss.64  By the time 
the District Court ruled on the merits of the appeal, all of the Transferee 
Litigation had settled except the litigation targeting the $5,000,000 claim 
held by Citigroup’s transferee Springfield Associates, LLC.65  A Citigroup 
 
 57. See Reorganized Debtors’ Fourth Amended Complaint for the Avoidance and 
Return of Preferential Payments and Fraudulent Transfers, Equitable Subordination, and 
Damages, Together with Objections and Counterclaims to Creditor Defendants’ Claims, 
Enron Corp. v. Citigroup Inc., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter 
MegaComplaint].  
 58. MegaComplaint, supra note 57, at ¶ 1. 
 59. See, id., at counts 1 – 4 (detailing allegedly improper transfers and dealings). 
 60. See, id., at counts 5, 72, and 73 (related counts). 
 61. See, id., at count 73 (related counts). 
 62. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for the Disallowance and Equitable Subordination of 
Claims Against the Reorganized Debtors Formerly Held by Citigroup Inc. or its Affiliates, 
In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425, 429, No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2005) 
[hereinafter MegaDefendant Transferee Complaint]; see In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425, 
429 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the Transferee Litigation). 
 63. See In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. at 429-30 (describing the Transferee Litigation). 
 64. See In re Enron Corp., No. 01-06134, 2006 WL 2548592 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) 
(District Court’s Opinion and Order granting leave to file interlocutory appeal).  See 
generally In re Enron Corp., 333 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Bankruptcy Court 
opinion on equitable subordination of transferred claims); In re Enron Corp., 340 B.R. 180 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Bankruptcy Court opinion on disallowance of transferred claims). 
 65. See In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425, 430 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (deciding the 
merits of the interlocutory appeal). 
WIENERFINAL_TWO 1/18/2010  6:01:42 PM 
2009] TRANSFERRED BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS 49 
 
entity held the challenged claim, based on a revolving credit agreement, at 
the time of Enron’s bankruptcy filing; the Citigroup entity subsequently 
transferred the claim to a Deutsche Bank entity, which then transferred the 
claim to Springfield. 
In a published decision, In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007), the District Court vacated the Bankruptcy Court orders before it, 
ruled that a transferred claim can be subject to disallowance and equitable 
subordination if it is transferred through an assignment, but not if it is 
transferred through a sale, and remanded the matter for further 
consideration.66 
The District Court’s Enron ruling is unusual for at least two reasons.  
First, it is unusual in that it draws a distinction between the consequences 
of transferring a claim through a sale, as opposed to an assignment, that 
neither the parties that appealed to the District Court nor the amici curiae 
thought carried any significance.67 
Commentators do not appreciate the distinction either.  According to 
 
 66. See id. at 448-49.  Springfield unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal the ruling to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  See In re Enron Corp., 2007 WL 
2780394 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Ultimately, whether the claim of the transferee could be 
disallowed or equitably subordinated was never tried because, as part of a global settlement, 
Enron, various Citigroup entities, and others agreed that the claim would be allowed. See 
Global Settlement Agreement, dated as of April 4, 2008, Section 2.2 (execution copy 
available on Enron’s website, at 
http://www.enron.com/media/EXECUTED_GSA_WITH_LIVE_SIGNATURES.pdf) 
(hereinafter, the “Global Settlement Agreement”).  The Global Settlement Agreement also 
addressed the treatment of another set of transferred claims that the Enron debtors 
challenged outside of the Transferee Litigation. Citibank and a special purpose entity named 
Delta Energy Corp. transferred the challenged claims to certain other MegaComplaint 
defendants via credit default swaps that were triggered by Enron’s bankruptcy filings.  See 
In re Enron Corp. Securities Litigation, MDL-1446, Civil Action No. H-05-1191, Yosemite 
Securities Trust I et al. v. Citibank, N.A., Citigroup, Inc. & Delta Energy Corp., dated 
August 18, 2006 (claim transferees’ complaint against claim transferors). 
 67. See Memorandum in Support of Motion by Springfield Associates, LLC to Modify 
Order and Judgment for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal, In re Enron Corp., Nos. 06 
Civ. 7828 (SAS), 07 Civ. 1957 (SAS), 2007 WL 3314379 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (“and 
the Court's Decision, which provided an additional theory that had been advocated by 
neither appellants, appellee, nor any of the amici curiae, further underscores the substantial 
grounds for difference of opinion on the issues.”); Statement of Amici Curiae the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, and the Loan Syndications and Trading Association in Support of Motion by 
Springfield Associates, LLC to Modify Order and Judgment for Certification of 
Interlocutory Appeal, In re Enron Corp., Nos. 01-01634 (AJG), 06-07828 (SAS), 2007 WL 
3316977 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2007) (“amici respectfully submit that the Decision's 
distinction between a ‘sale’ and an ‘assignment’—a distinction that amici did not fully 
appreciate until the Decision issued—is not legally relevant to the analysis.  Indeed, Enron 
has already asserted in this case that whether a transfer ‘was a sale rather than an assignment 
. . . is irrelevant as a matter of law.’ (Enron's post-argument letter to the Court, ¶ 4 (August 
9, 2007).)”). 
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Norton Creditors’ Rights Handbook: 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently 
held that equitable subordination will be effective against a 
transferee when received by pure assignment, operation of law, 
or subrogation but will be generally ineffective against a 
purchaser who takes by way of a sale.  The court never explains 
the difference between an assignment and a sale, and the case law 
does not bear out the distinction.68 
The practitioners agree.  One observed: 
It is hard to come up with examples of something that is an 
“assignment” but not a sale.  A sale is a form of assignment 
involving consideration, but that is obviously not the distinction 
that [the District Court] was making.  [The Court] discusses the 
presence of an indemnity, but since it was clear that Springfield 
had received an indemnity, that could not have been the 
controlling factor, either--otherwise, [the Court] would have 
concluded that Springfield had received an assignment and would 
not have remanded the case for determination of whether the 
transfer was an assignment or a sale.69 
Another practitioner writing about the decision observed: 
This recent district court opinion is a significant development in 
 
 68. WILLIAM L. NORTON, III & ROGER G. JONES, NORTON CREDITORS’ RIGHTS 
HANDBOOK § 8:8 (2008); accord Professor Stephen L. Sepinuck, Joint Review Committee 
for Article 9 of the UCC Meeting Notes for October 3-5, 2008, 5 THE EAGLE 9 NEWSLETTER 
UCC DIV., Issue 1, Winter 2009, at 26-27, available at 
http://www.eagle9.com/newsletters/newsletter_5_1.pdf (Apr. 5, 2009): 
Issue: Whether the Enron debt trading case, distinguishing between a “sale” and an 
“assignment” of a loan, should be addressed in the Official Comments. 
Explanation: In connection with claims trading the question sometimes arises as to whether 
the obligor on a debt may assert claims and defenses against the transferee of the claim. 
Traditionally this issue has been analyzed by considering whether the transferee qualifies as 
a holder in due course (in the case of a claim embodied in a negotiable instrument) or other 
good faith purchaser for value (in the case of other claims), in which case the obligor 
generally may not assert claims and defenses against the transferee. In addressing this issue 
with respect to the bankruptcy rights of a transferee, the court in In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 
425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), by interpreting several cases under state law, has articulated a 
distinction between “assignments” and “sales.” According to the court, a claim of a 
transferee who takes by sale is not subject to equitable subordination or disallowance under 
the Bankruptcy Code, while a claim that is taken by assignment is subject to these 
disabilities.  No such distinction appears in the Uniform Commercial Code.  The Official 
Comments might confirm that, when the term “assignment” is used in the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the term includes a sale and is not distinct from a sale.  Cf. Official 
Comment 26 to § 9-102. 
The Committee decided not to address this issue. 
 69. Kathy L. Yeatter, Judicial Vagaries and their Potential Impact on the Valuation of 
Distressed Debt: Reasonable Minds Can Differ as to What it all Means, 26 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 50, 51-52 (2007) (attributed to Robin Phelan). 
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the area of claim purchasing.  Unfortunately, the distinction 
created by the Enron decision has created much confusion for 
claims purchasers.  While the district court went a long way to 
support the claims trading industry in terms of shielding buyers 
from liability for creditor misconduct, the district court created a 
new conundrum for the claims trading industry by turning its 
decision on the sale versus assignment analysis - terms that the 
financial world has always used interchangeably.  Thus, certain 
trade associations have sought resolution of this issue by a higher 
court.  Until then, practitioners may want to review the district 
court case before structuring their claims purchases to maximize 
protections offered a transferee of a claim under the district 
court's analysis.70 
The second unusual aspect of the Enron rulings is that, although the 
litigation attracted a lot of attention when it was pending,71 it appears that 
sophisticated claims traders have not incorporated the resulting 
sale/assignment distinction into transaction papers for claim transfers.  
Claims are still being transferred pursuant to documentation referencing an 
assignment.72 
 
 70. Jennifer Witherell Crastz, Can a Claims Purchaser Receive Better Rights (or Worse 
Rights) than its Transferor in a Bankruptcy?, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 365, 373 (2007); see also 
Lawrence J. Kotler, Are Equitable Subordination and Disallowance Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 
502(d) Attributes of a Claim or Personal Disabilities of the Claimant - An Analysis of Enron 
Corp. v. Springfield Associates, L.L.C., 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 ART. 2 (2008) (“While 
the District Court rectified many of the issues that were raised by the Bankruptcy Court's 
earlier decisions, its distinction between a sale versus an assignment of the claim has caused 
significant concern in the claims trading arena, especially since many purchase agreements 
use the words ‘sale’ and ‘assignment’ interchangeably. Hopefully, this issue will be squarely 
addressed, but, in light of the District Court's denial of interlocutory relief of its opinion, this 
will have to wait until another day.”). 
 71. For example, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, and the Loan Syndications and Trading 
Association filed a Statement in support of the transferee’s attempt to take the issues up to 
the Second Circuit.  See Statement of Amici Curiae the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, and the Loan 
Syndications and Trading Association in Support of Motion by Springfield Associates, LLC 
to Modify Order and Judgment for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal, In re Enron Corp., 
2007 WL 3316977 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 01-16034) (supporting a transferee’s attempt to 
take issues up to the Second Circuit). 
 72. See, e.g., Notice of Transfer of Claim Other than for Security, In re Delphi Corp., 
No. 05-44481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2007) (filing a claim transfer agreement titled 
“Assignment of Claim” as part of the Notice); Notice of Transfer of Claim Other than for 
Security, In re Delphi Corp., No. 05-44481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2007) (filing a claim 
transfer agreement titled “Assignment of Claim” as part of the Notice). 
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D. Attempts to Disallow Claims Asserted By Transferee Against the 
Ames Debtors 
In the bankruptcy proceedings of Ames Department Stores, a dispute 
arose over whether the claim transferor’s receipt of preferences precluded 
the claim transferee from receiving a distribution on account of transferred 
administrative expense claims.  The Bankruptcy and District Courts ruled 
that the transferee could not be paid for its administrative expense claims 
until the preferences were disgorged.73 
 The disputes in Ames and Enron differ in two significant ways.  
First, in Ames there were no allegations of misconduct against the initial 
holder of the claims; the Ames debtors only sought disallowance of claims 
based on receipt of preferences and did not seek equitable subordination in 
the alternative as the debtors did in Enron.  Second, the claims at issue in 
Enron were for bank debt incurred prior to Enron’s bankruptcy filing, 
while the claims at issue in Ames were administrative expense claims74 
based on goods provided by a vendor following Ames’ bankruptcy filing. 
 At issue in Ames was the allowance of two claims totaling $393,000 
transferred by Ames’ vendor, G & A Sales, Inc. to claims trader ASM 
Capital, L.P..75  Ames sued G & A Sales, seeking to avoid and recover 
preferences, and obtained a default judgment in the amount of $825,138.  G 
& A Sales filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding and never satisfied the 
judgment.76  The Bankruptcy Court found that it was “highly unlikely that 
Ames will recover on the judgment, or any material part of it.”77  The Court 
concluded that, as a result, the G & A Sales claims transferred to ASM 
Capital would be disallowed pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 502(d).78  
The Court observed that ASM Capital could avoid this result “by ASM’s 
making an economically disadvantageous payment for the amount for 
which G & A is liable to Ames.”79 
 The Bankruptcy Court also held that Bankruptcy Code section 
502(d) “applies to all claims,” i.e., claims that accrue both before and after 
 
 73. Decision and Order on Motion for Entry of Supplemental Order Denying Request 
for Allowance and Payment of Administrative Expense Claim, and Compelling Payment of 
Reclamation Claim, In re Ames Department Stores, Inc., No. 01-42217 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Ames Bankruptcy Court Ruling]; ASM Capital, L.P. v. Ames 
Department Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Department Stores Inc.), No. 1:07-cv-00219 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Ames District Court Ruling]. 
 74. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2009) (providing for allowance of administrative 
expense claims). 
 75. Ames Bankruptcy Court Ruling, supra note 73, at 2-3. 
 76. Id. at 7-8. 
 77. Id. at 8. 
 78. See supra Part I-A (discussing claim disallowance based on receipt of voidable 
transfers). 
 79. Ames Bankruptcy Court Ruling, supra note 73, at 10.. 
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the bankruptcy filing of the entity against which they are asserted.80  The 
District Court affirmed the decision on appeal.81  Neither the Bankruptcy 
Court nor the District Court rulings differentiated between claim transfers 
via sale versus assignment.82 
E. State of the Law in the Southern District of New York in Light of 
the Conflicting Rulings 
While prior rulings on an issue can be persuasive, neither bankruptcy 
court nor district court decisions are binding in the Second Circuit.  The 
next time the issues addressed in Enron and Ames Department Stores come 
up, the trial and appellate courts may choose to follow the bankruptcy 
court’s decisions in Enron, the bankruptcy and district court decisions in 
Ames (which are in the same vein), the rationale of the district court 
decision in Enron, or pursue a different route entirely. 
As the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has 
explained: “The authorities are in agreement that a decision issued by a 
single bankruptcy judge in a multi-judge bankruptcy court is not binding on 
the other bankruptcy judges.  Indeed, the decision of a single district judge 
in a multi-judge district has been held not to be binding on the bankruptcy 
court.  Thus, in this district, which has both a multi-judge bankruptcy court 
and a multi-judge district court, only decisions of the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals are controlling.”83 
 Until either the Second Circuit or the United States Supreme Court 
rules on whether a transferred claim is subject to disallowance or equitable 
subordination based on the conduct of the holder of the claim as of the 
bankruptcy filing, the issue will remain open in the Southern District of 
New York, which continues to attract the largest and most complex 
Chapter 11 filings.84  Therefore, it is unclear whether a bankruptcy claim 
 
 80. Id. at 3-4. 
 81. Ames District Court Ruling, supra note 73; see also In re Ames Department Stores, 
Inc., No. 07-1063-mb (2d Cir. May 8, 2007 and June 5, 2007) (denying leave to appeal to 
the Second Circuit). 
 82. See Ames Bankruptcy Court Ruling, supra note 73; Ames District Court Ruling, 
supra note 73. 
 83. In re 400 Madison Avenue Ltd. Partnership, 213 B.R. 888, 890 n.2 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal citations omitted).  See Weber v. U.S., 484 F.3d 154, 158 n.1 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (noting that bankruptcy lawyers have expressed concern over lack of binding 
precedent).  See generally Philip White Jr., Precedential Effect of Bankruptcy Court, 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, or District Court Bankruptcy Case Decisions, 8 A.L.R. FED. 
2D 155 (2006) (discussing the issue of precedential effect of legal rulings by the lower 
federal bankruptcy courts on other bankruptcy courts). 
 84. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corporation, No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
In re Chrysler, LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 05-
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can receive better treatment in the hands of a transferee than it would have 
received in the hands of the transferor. 
II. Are all of the Rights to Payment Arising Out of the Receivables 
Underlying a Claim Transferred When a Claim is Transferred? 
 The answer is apparently, no, according to last year’s bench ruling 
by the bankruptcy court presiding over the Chapter 11 proceedings of 
Delphi Corporation and its affiliates. 
The ruling arose in the context of an unsuccessful motion filed by 
claim transferees Argo Partners, Inc., ASM Capital, Avenue Capital 
Management, LLC, Contrarian Capital Management, LLC, Hain Capital 
Group, Longacre Master Fund, Ltd., and Sierra Liquidity Fund, LLC 
(collectively, the “Ad Hoc Trade Committee”) that sought, among other 
things, the ability to respond to cure notices sent out by the debtors and to 
have cure payments sent directly to the claim transferees.85  The cure 
notices provided Delphi’s views on the amounts the Delphi debtors owed 
each supplier and had to pay in order to assume supply contracts.  These 
payments were necessary because Bankruptcy Code section 365 requires 
that debtors cure defaults in order to assume executory contracts.86 
The Delphi debtors had mailed cure notices to some of their 
counterparties to supply agreements, many of which had transferred their 
claims to members of the Ad Hoc Trade Committee; the debtors also 
mailed notices to each of the transferee Ad Hoc Trade Committee 
members.87  Delphi opposed the motion, arguing that, while the members of 
the Ad Hoc Trade Committee were holders of assignments of accounts 
receivable, they were not assignees of the underlying supply contracts.  
Delphi argued that, as a result, the Ad Hoc Trade Committee members 
could neither respond to the cure notices with competing views of amounts 
 
17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-15533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
 85. See Motion for Order (I) Extending Deadline for Submission of Cure Notices, (II) 
Approving the Cure Notices Executed by Movants with Respect to their Claims, and (III) 
Directing the Debtors (A) to Reconcile Cure Claims with Corresponding Claims, and (B) to 
Make Cure Claim Distributions Directly to Movants, In re Delphi Corp., No. 05-44481 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2008), [hereinafter Ad Hoc Trade Committee Motion]. 
 86. See Debtors’ Response to Ad Hoc Trade Committee’s Motion for Order (I) 
Extending Deadline for Submission of Cure Notices, (II) Approving Cure Notices Executed 
by Movants with Respect to their Claims, and (III) Directing Debtors (A) to Reconcile Cure 
Claims with Corresponding Claims, and (B) to Make Cure Claim Distribution Directly to 
Movants at ¶ 14, In re Delphi Corp., No. 05-44481, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter Debtors’ Response to Ad Hoc Trade Committee Motion] (citing 11 U.S.C. § 
365(b)(1)(A)). 
 87. See Debtors’ Response to Ad Hoc Trade Committee Motion, supra note 86, at ¶¶ 2-
3. 
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owed nor receive cure payments directly from the debtors.88 
The interplay between claim and cure that underlies the dispute in 
Delphi’s bankruptcy proceedings can sometimes be complex.  A claim 
reflects a creditor’s view of the total amount a debtor owes it as of the date 
the bankruptcy petition is filed.89  A creditor may have several contracts 
with a debtor.  If so, the claim should reflect the total amount owing and 
amounts owed under each of the various contracts.90  In order to continue to 
receive benefits under a contract after emerging from bankruptcy, a debtor 
must cure defaults, compensate its counterparty for losses resulting from 
defaults, and provide adequate assurance of future performance under the 
contract.91  Because a claim can reflect amounts owing under multiple 
contracts, and a debtor may pick which contracts it will assume and cure 
defaults under only those contracts, cure amounts and claim amounts only 
equal in instances where the creditor filed claims reflecting defaults under 
each contract, and every contract underlying a claim is assumed by the 
debtor. 
 From a claim transferee’s perspective, the amount of a cure payment 
is important because it can reduce the amounts owing to the transferee 
under a claim.  Transferees are also concerned about where the debtor 
sends the cure payment because, if the debtor sends the payment to the 
original holders of transferred claims, the transferees have to take steps to 
obtain the cure payments, notwithstanding that their transfer documents 
give them the right to receive all payments made on account of the 
receivables underlying the claims.92  In Delphi’s case, the claim transferees 
were also concerned about who was authorized to respond to the cure 
notices because the notices allowed Delphi’s counterparties to receive cure 
payments either in the form of cash or in the form of equity in the 
reorganized Delphi.93 
 After considering the competing arguments advanced by the debtors 
and the transferees, the Bankruptcy Court presiding over Delphi’s Chapter 
11 proceedings denied the transferees’ motion.  The Court was more 
 
 88. See Debtors’ Response to Ad Hoc Trade Committee Motion, supra note 86, at ¶¶ 13, 
14 & 16 (explaining that cure payments were neither owed nor could they be responded to).  
 89. See Bankruptcy Forms Manual, B 10 Proof of Claim Form, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK_Forms_Pending_2008/B_010_1208v4.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2009) (proof of claim form). 
 90. See id. at 2, Nos. 1,7 (requiring creditors to indicate the total amount owed to them 
and attach documentation or a summary when filing a proof of claim). 
 91. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (2009) (concerning assumption and rejection of 
executory contracts and unexpired leases). 
 92. Transcript of Hearing at 50, In re Delphi Corp., Chapter 11 Case No. 05-44481 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008). 
 93. Debtors’ Response to Ad Hoc Trade Committee Motion, supra note 86, ¶¶ 22-23, 
n.2. 
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concerned about facilitating the cure process and the relationship between 
the debtor and its counterparties than it was about the relationship created 
between the claim transferors and their transferees under the claim transfer 
agreements.  The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the relief sought by the 
Ad Hoc Trade Committee was contrary to the terms of the solicitation 
order it had entered, which governed the cure notice process, and ruled: 
All right.  I think that the relief you're seeking here is relief that, 
as [Debtors’ counsel] says, is contrary to the [solicitation 
procedures] order.  And that order was on, I believe, ample 
notice.  It also, and as importantly, is relief that I think is not 
merely a procedural correction of an error or relief that would 
have no material effect on the debtors or other parties in interest.  
The main reason for that conclusion is that I think it depends -- 
granting the relief would depend on me overlooking the primary 
relationship here, in fact the only relationship here, that the 
debtor has, which is with its contract counter party, who are 
obviously ongoing trade suppliers and vendees who are important 
to the debtor's ongoing business.  And under Section 365, they 
are the ones who really need to deal with the cure notice, because 
it's not just a cure notice.  It's an assumption notice that lays out 
and reminds the contract parties -- counter parties, of their rights 
under Section 365, which are not limited to insisting upon cure. 
I believe that your clients, as a very function of the assignment 
agreement which they entered into, know who these people are 
and could have, and I believe as you say they have, contacted 
them and given them what your clients believe are their 
obligations under your clients' agreements with those people.  
But those aren't three-party agreements.  The debtor is not a party 
to those agreements.  And if they don't do what they're supposed 
to do under your agreements, you have rights against them.  I 
don't know what those obligations are and what those rights are 
because they're not in the record.94  But I believe that, again, as I 
said earlier, contrary to when I signed this order to show cause, 
this is not an instance where the debtor is just being difficult 
about a deadline or a procedure and trying to prevent the real 
party in interest from having its wishes set forth; but rather would 
have the debtor change the relationship with its contract parties 
and get in the middle of your relationship with them.  And they're 
really two separate relationships.95 
 
 94. At a subsequent hearing, in which claim transfer agreements between various 
members of the Ad Hoc Trade Committee and Delphi’s counterparties were part of the 
record before the Court, the Court nonetheless concluded that Delphi need not send the cure 
payments directly to the claim transferees. Transcript of Hearing at 200-02, In re Delphi 
Corp., Chapter 11 Case No. 05-44481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008). 
 95. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 92, at 98-99. 
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 The ruling in Delphi’s bankruptcy proceedings underscores that a 
transferee risks that its claim will be reduced, in whole or in part, by a 
process that the Court determines should take place between the debtor and 
its counterparties.  As such, this ruling shows that not all of the rights to 
payment arising out of the receivables underlying a transferred bankruptcy 
claim can be transferred with the claim. 
III. Can a Creditor Transfer Contingent Reimbursement Rights When it 
Transfers its Bankruptcy Claims? 
Apparently, yes.  In In re M. Fabrikant & Sons,96 the Bankruptcy 
Court ruled that the Chapter 11 debtors’ original lenders had lost their 
rights to be reimbursed for attorneys’ fees and expenses because they 
transferred their indemnification rights when they transferred their 
bankruptcy claims and security interests to the debtors’ new lenders.  The 
dispute arose in connection with confirmation of the debtors’ Chapter 11 
plan, which did not provide for payment of “substantial legal fees and 
expenses” incurred and “estimated future fees and expenses” to be incurred 
by the debtors’ original lenders for matters including the defense of 
litigation brought by the unsecured creditors’ committee after the claims 
were transferred.97  The original lenders had transferred via assignment “all 
claims (including ‘claims’ as defined in Bankruptcy Code Section 101(5)), 
suits, causes of action, and any other right of Seller or any Prior Seller, 
whether known or unknown . . . arising under or in connection with the 
Credit Documents or the transactions related thereto or contemplated 
thereby.”98 
The Bankruptcy Court held that the original lenders’ reimbursement 
rights had been transferred with the claims in light of the broad Bankruptcy 
Code definition of “claim.”99   The Court went on to reject the balance of 
the arguments advanced by the original lenders in support of their 
objections to plan confirmation, including the argument that contingent 
reimbursement rights are not assignable.100 
The ruling left the original lenders in a position where they could not 
seek reimbursement for legal fees and expenses, incurred or to be incurred, 
either through the debtors’ plan or through counterclaims in the litigation 
brought by the creditors’ committee.101  As such, the ruling emphasizes the 
 
 96. In re M. Frabrikant & Sons, Inc., 385 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 97. Id. at 89-90 & 94-96. 
 98. Id. at 95. 
 99. Id. at 95, 98; see supra note 1 (discussing the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition 
of a “claim”). 
 100. M. Fabrikant, supra note 96, at 96-101. 
 101. Id. at 98-99. 
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need for creditors who hold contingent reimbursement rights to negotiate 
carve-outs when they transfer their claims for repayment of debt. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither legislation nor the courts have yet crystallized the nature of 
the transferred bankruptcy claim.  One’s perspective on the nature of the 
transferred bankruptcy claim seems to depend on what one is trying to do 
with it.  Claims-trading advocates view bankruptcy cases as creating a 
“distressed claims-trading market.”102  From this perspective, it would be 
ideal to have bankruptcy claims transferred, with all of the rights enjoyed 
by the initial claim holders, but free of defects such as susceptibility to 
disallowance and equitable subordination.  On the other hand, from the 
perspective of debtors and courts handling the claims administration 
process and related litigation, it makes sense that a transferee of a claim in 
a bankruptcy should obtain no more than could the creditor into whose 
shoes it steps.  The Delphi Bankruptcy Court has gone a step further.  
Acting out of concern for the cure process, the court ruled that a transferee 
could get less from the bankruptcy estate than could the transferor. 
The issue of what returns are appropriate for debts purchased at a 
discount was all over the headlines earlier this year.103  Hedge funds 
purchased Chrysler bonds at a discount prior to the automaker’s bankruptcy 
filing and refused to accept returns of about a third of the face value of the 
bonds proposed by the U.S. government.104  President Obama accused the 
hedge funds of being “speculators” who forced Chrysler into bankruptcy by 
 
 102. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Saferstein & Penny Dearborn, Equitable Subordination: Good-
Faith Transferees Beware, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 46, 73 (2006) (anticipating that the 
Enron bankruptcy court’s purported disregard for traditional principles of equitable 
subordination would become a serious potential disruption to the distressed claim-trading 
market). 
 103. See, e.g., Neil King Jr. & Jeffrey McCracken, U.S. Forced Chrysler’s Creditors to 
Blink, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2009, at A1 available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124199948894005017.html (covering President Obama’s 
announcement that Chrysler could face a disorderly bankruptcy or even liquidation); 
Zachery Kouwe, The Lenders Obama Decided to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/business/01hedge.html; Liz Moyer, Hedge 
Fund Chief Hits Back at Obama, Forbes.com, May 5, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/05/chrysler-obama-bonds-business-wall-street-asness.html; 
Steven Mufson & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, In Chrysler Saga, Hedge Funds Cast as Prime 
Villain: Firms Say They Were Right to Hold Out, WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/30/AR2009043004141.html; Ann Woolner, Chrysler’s Greedy 
Hedge Fund Holdouts Get It Right, Bloomberg.com, May 6, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=azVYi8YEXsAc (discussing 
the issue with respect to Chrysler and its creditors). 
 104. Mufson & Tse, supra note 103. 
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holding out for an “unjustified tax-payer funded bailout.”105  The hedge 
funds’ response was that their investments were entitled to priority under 
well-established bankruptcy law and that they were obligated to seek 
returns reflecting their stakeholders’ rights.106  Competing views over what 
constitutes an appropriate return on investments in distressed debt will no 
doubt be heard again as the economic downturn leads to continued 
investments in companies that have either sought bankruptcy protection or 
are teetering on the brink. 
Given the great public interest in the outcome of the restructuring of 
financially distressed companies, and the billions at stake for investors in 
distressed debt both within and without bankruptcy, the case law on the 
claims trading issues discussed in this article and related issues will 
continue to evolve.  Stay tuned as lawmakers either intervene or leave it to 





 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
